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* This paper has been written for a forthcoming Handbook on the Economics of Technical Change, 
Bronwyn Hall and Nathan Rosenberg, editors.  The author is indebted to members of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research productivity workshop and Christina Scherer for helpful comments. 
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  This article, written for the forthcoming Handbook of the Economics of Technical 
Change, surveys the costs, risks, and challenges encountered in the progressive discovery 
and development of new pharmaceuticals.  The changing methods by which drugs are 
discovered, the links between companies and academic science, the changing character of 
public regulation, and the sharp rise in the cost per new approved drug are analyzed.  
Determining which new drugs are both efficacious and safe poses classic statistical 
decision theory problems.  Why patents are so important to drug developers is explored.  
A rent-seeking theory of new drug development is proposed to rationalize the high gross 
margins but only slightly supra-normal returns on investment realized by pharmaceutical 








  The discovery and development of new pharmaceutical substances are among the most 
interesting of innovation processes.  Unusually large privately-financed expenditures on research 
and development (R&D) outlays are required to achieve a successful new product, and relative to 
the pharmaceutical industry's sales, R&D/sales ratios are extraordinarily high.  The links to 
academic science and basic research performed in government laboratories are rich.  The 
expectation of patent protection plays a more important role than in most other high-technology 
industries.  New products must meet not only the test of market acceptance, but also survive 
rigorous scrutiny from government regulatory agencies.  And the medical services market into 
which pharmaceuticals sell is itself unusually complex, with a significant fraction of consumers' 
purchases, at least in the wealthier nations, covered by insurance and hence subject to diverse 
moral hazard and adverse selection imperfections.  Despite these problems, there is compelling 
evidence that the introduction of many new pharmaceutical products has yielded substantial net 
benefits in extending human lives and reducing the burden of disease.  See e.g. Lichtenberg 
(2004, 2007), Long et al. (2006), and Murphy and Topel (2006). 
  Among these various characteristics, we focus preliminarily on one:  the high ratio of 
pharmaceutical companies' R&D spending in relation to their sales.  The clearest indicator of this 
trait comes from data systematically collected over the years by the U.S. industry trade 
association, previously called the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) and more 
recently the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of  America (PhRMA).  The solid line 
in Figure 1 shows aggregate PhRMA member company-financed R&D expenditures within the 
United States as a percentage of U.S. sales for the years 1970-2005.  From 12.4 percent in 1970 
declining to 11.8 percent in recession year 1974, the spending ratio rose to a peak of 21.6 percent 
in 1996 before declining to its 2005 value of 19.2 percent.  Included for comparison is a more 
fragmentary series (dotted line) of data on company-financed R&D outlays as a percent of sales 
for all manufacturing corporations reporting R&D expenditures in periodic National Science 
Foundation surveys.  In recent years, pharmaceutical R&D/sales ratios have been nearly seven 
times those of their all-manufacturing counterparts. 2 
 
  The National Science Foundation data are often cited as an indicator of research intensity 
in pharmaceuticals.  For the years 1999-2003, the average R&D/sales ratio for the NSF industry 
category "pharmaceuticals and medicines" was 9.2 percent, compared to 18.3 percent with the 
PhRMA series in Figure 1.  But the NSF figures are biased downward because they are 
assembled using what is called the whole company method, under which all the R&D outlays 
and sales for a company are assigned to the industry in which the company has its largest volume 
of sales.  Thus, they are aggregations of pharmaceutical companies' R&D activity in their home 
industry along with data from the much less research-intensive toiletries, cosmetics, first aid 
supplies, and insurance payment processing industries, among others.  That the PhRMA data 
present a more accurate picture of what transpires in modern pharmaceutical manufacturing is 
revealed through data collected by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (1985, p. 31) for the 
1970s in narrowly-defined "lines of business."  For "ethical drugs" in 1977, the reported 
company-financed R&D/sales ratio was 10.2 percent, compared to 11.3 percent in the 
contemporaneous PMA report (which excluded many older, i.e. generic, drug sales).  Among the 
220 lines of business for which the FTC reported 1977 data (and also for 1974 through 1976), 
ethical drugs had the highest R&D/sales ratio of any industry.  For proprietary (e.g., over-the-
counter) drugs, the comparable ratio in the 1977 FTC report was 2.9 percent, for toiletries and 
cosmetics, 2.5 percent, and for surgical and medical supplies, 3.8 percent. 
  From the R&D efforts of pharmaceutical companies has flowed a stream of new 
products, which is traced in Figure 2 through a count of the "new chemical entities" approved for 
marketing in the United States by the governing regulatory agency, the Food and Drug 
Administration.  Excluded from the count are new formulations of existing products, 
combinations of previously approved entities, new uses of approved products, and most new 
biological entities and vaccines (in principle, the output of a somewhat different industry covered 
elsewhere in this volume).
1  The unusually robust upward fluctuations for 1995 and 1996 came 
from backlog reductions on drugs awaiting approval by the Food and Drug Administration.   
When those two years are excluded, the average number of new chemical entities approved per 
                                                 
1. In collecting R&D statistics, the U.S. Census Bureau and National Science Foundation record biologically-
oriented companies as chemicals manufacturers when they sell substantial amounts of product but as research and 
development service providers when they have not yet marketed products.  3 
 
year between 1970 and 2005 was 21.4, with a statistically significant upward time trend. 
 
2. Time Phases 
 
  It is customary to characterize new drug discovery and development in terms of time 
phases.  The principal dichotomy is between the pre-clinical and clinical phases.   
  In the pre-clinical phase, research efforts are oriented at first toward isolating chemical or 
biological molecules that might have interesting therapeutic action in vitro and then testing for 
such action in diverse animals.  The "animal model" tests often involve several different species, 
progressing over time from worms, mice, guinea pigs, and the like up the evolutionary scale to 
dogs and monkeys. 
  If those tests suggest that the drug might be efficacious and not cause toxic effects, the 
drug developer works to formulate the candidate in a form (e.g., pill) suitable for medical use 
and seeks permission to begin tests in human beings -- i.e., in the clinical trial phase.  In the 
United States, formal approval for clinical testing occurs when the Food and Drug 
Administration issues a so-called IND -- i.e., investigation of new drug -- permit.  The clinical 
phase is in turn conventionally divided into three main phases.  In Phase I, the drug is 
administered to a small number of subjects, sometimes with the target disease and sometimes 
not, to test for the safety of various dosages and (when diseased subjects are included) for 
preliminary indications of therapeutic efficacy.  More careful and extensive tests for therapeutic 
efficacy are conducted in Phase II.  If those tests are promising, the effort moves into Phase III, 
in which the drug is administered to at least two panels of patients who might be expected to 
benefit from the therapy.  The number of subjects can run to as high as several thousand, 
especially for drugs targeted toward already curable diseases or that will be used for long-term 
therapy.  With the principal exception of drugs combatting diseases (such as AIDS) that could be 
lethal if untreated, the tests are double-blind, with half the subjects receiving the drug being 
tested and the other half an inert placebo or, less frequently, an alternative drug known to be 
effective against the disease.  Under the double-blind approach, neither the recipients of the drug 
nor (to minimize subtle psychological influences) the administrators know whether a specific 
subject is receiving the drug being tested or a placebo.  If the Phase III trials yield favorable 
results, the firm sponsoring the trials applies in the United States to the FDA (or in Europe to the 4 
 
European Medicines Agency
2) for a New Drug Approval (NDA), submitting voluminous trial 
data to support its application.  Testing often continues during and after the approval interval 
through Phase IV trials, sometimes to answer unresolved questions posed by the regulatory 
agency and sometimes to provide additional evidence for the sponsoring company's planned 
marketing campaign. 
  Figure 3 presents a stylized characterization of the annual rate at which funds are spent in 
pharmaceutical discovery and development leading to a specific useful molecule and how the 
spending cycle is divided among the various phases.  No overlap among phases is assumed, 
although some overlap can in practice occur.  The spending rate is relatively modest in the early 
pre-clinical phases, rises sharply as clinical tests begin, peaks during Phase III human trials, and 
then tends to decline abruptly with application for regulatory approval and movement into Phase 
IV tests, if any.   
  Detailed analyses of selected drug development histories by DiMasi et al. (1991, 2003) 
provide among other things estimates of the attrition rates marking transition into successive 
clinical testing phases and ultimate marketing approval.  For self-originated drugs brought into 
clinical testing by multinational pharmaceutical companies between 1970 and 1982, some 23 
percent of the molecules entering Phase I testing ultimately gained marketing approval from 
government regulators following the completion of Phase III.  For a later cohort initially tested in 
humans between 1983 and 1994, the estimated success rate was 21.5 percent.
3  In the later study, 
the attrition rate between Phase I and Phase II was 29 percent; between Phases II and III it was 
56 percent.  Of the molecules brought into Phase III, 68.5 percent survived; thus, 31.5 percent 
failed during Phase III.  In pharmaceuticals, it would appear that substantial risks of total failure 
persist later in the research and development cycle than in most other industries.  More typically, 
as the rate of R&D spending rises, uncertainties abate, although uncertainties concerning market 
acceptance persist well past completion of the principal R&D tasks.  See Branscomb and 
Auerswald (2001).  Indeed, unless key technical uncertainties are resolved at relatively low 
                                                 
2.  See Healy and Kaitin (1999).  Before 2004, the organization was called the European Agency for the Evaluation 
of Medicinal Products. 
3.  For more recent success rate estimates using a different sampling approach, see Tufts Center (2006). 5 
 
spending levels, firms conducting the R&D in non-pharmaceutical fields will typically choose 
not to carry their efforts into higher levels of annual expenditure. 
  On average in recent U.S. experience, Phases I through III span six to seven years, with 
the regulatory approval process consuming an additional one to two years.  On this, more later.  
There is considerable variation from case to case; drugs for rare and incurable diseases are often 
tested and approved on expedited timetables.  Even more variation is found in the length of pre-
clinical research, and indeed, as we shall see, relevant events in the discovery process can 
sometimes be traced out to decades before testing in human beings commences. 
 
3. Changing Discovery Methods 
 
  Over time immemorial, humans found through trial and error that certain naturally-
occurring substances had medicinal effects.  Quinine, present in chinchona tree bark and first 
extracted by chemical methods in 1810, helped alleviate the symptoms of malaria. Vaccination, 
first with live smallpox toxin and then, thanks to Edward Jenner's experimentation in the 1790s, 
with a less dangerous vaccine based upon cowpox virus, helped eradicate the scourge of 
smallpox.   
  The bark of the white willow tree was known to provide relief against fevers and 
headaches.  The active substance, salicylic acid, was extracted and identified in the 1830s.   
Salicylic acid, however, had unpleasant side effects -- ulcers and other gastric distress.  Bayer 
A.G. of Germany had become one of the world's leading producers of synthetic dyestuffs, 
created through the manipulation and synthesis of organic chemical molecules.  In 1896 Bayer 
established a laboratory to synthesize and test dyestuff formulations for medicinal effects in 
humans.  One of its candidates, acetylsalicylic acid, proved to be as effective against fever and 
headaches as its parent molecule, salicylic acid, but with far milder side effects.  The new 
formulation was named "aspirin," which was patented, trademarked, licensed, and sold profitably 
by Bayer throughout the world.  See Mann and Plummer (1991).  The beginnings of the modern 
pharmaceutical industry can be traced to Bayer's work on aspirin.
4   
  German dye-makers (amalgamated under the umbrella of I.G. Farben) continued to test 
                                                 
4.  For various views on early pharmaceutical discovery approaches, see Schwartzman (1976, Chapter 2), 6 
 
coal-tar-based dyestuff variants for therapeutic effects, and in 1935, they discovered a wholly 
new class of so-called sulfa drugs, the first of which was sulfathiazole.  The sulfa drugs proved 
to be remarkably effective against a range of bacterial diseases such as spinal meningitis, various 
forms of pneumonia, and gonorrhea.  Variants were subsequently discovered to act as relatively 
safe diuretics, i.e., to reduce tendencies toward high blood pressure. 
  There was also progress on the theoretical front.  During the 19th Century much was 
learned about the nature of cells, vaccines, and disease processes in the human body.  In 1899 
Paul Ehrlich became director of the Institute for Experimental Therapy in Frankfurt/Main, 
Germany.  He conceived an "affinity" theory of small organic molecules' target-specific binding 
to particular sites in living organisms such as cells in the human body and postulated that if one 
could find the right "magic bullet," diseased and disease-causing organisms could be destroyed 
without otherwise harming their human carrier.  Salvarsan, one of the more than 600 molecules 
Ehrlich and colleagues synthesized and tested for therapeutic effects against syphilis, a 
widespread and essentially incurable disease, proved in 1908 to be effective. 
   The sulfa drugs provided a first line of defense against bacterial infections.  A new line 
began to open up in 1928 when Alexander Fleming of London observed, but did not follow 
through on, the anti-bacterial action of a mold that had drifted onto and killed bacteria he was 
culturing in a Petri dish.  His work was revitalized during the late 1930s by Howard Florey and 
Ernest Chain at Oxford University.  Recognizing the anti-bacterial properties of Fleming's 
discovery, penicillium notatum, and with financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation, 
they struggled to develop methods of producing the substance in quantities sufficient first to 
conduct tests in live subjects and then to use in general medical practice.  Their results were 
considered important to treating casualties from looming World War II, and so the British 
government approved their transmission to the United States government.  American defense 
authorities set in motion a major effort to produce penicillin in large quantities, eventually, by 
deep-vat fermentation in corn steep liquor -- a process developed initially by a U.S. Department 
of Agriculture laboratory in Peoria, Illinois.   Contracts to produce penicillin were let to 20 
chemical companies, which expanded production for military hospitals and simultaneously 
                                                                                                                                                             
Gambardella (1995), Werth (1994), and Pisano (2006, Chapter 2). 7 
 
gained expertise in the technology of antibiotics.
5  This massive effort provided a major impetus 
to the emergence of a vibrant American pharmaceutical industry. 
  While Alexander Fleming's penicillin discovery lay dormant, Selman Waksman of 
Rutgers University began investigating whether naturally occurring spores might have antibiotic 
properties.  With financial support from the Merck Company, Waksman and his students 
collected and tested against bacterial cultures approximately 10,000 soil samples.  They made 
two discoveries -- a new antibiotic, streptomycin, effective among other things against 
tuberculosis, and more importantly, a method for discovering even more new pharmaceuticals -- 
the systematic screening of molds, fungi, and other substances occurring in nature. 
  With Waksman's success, the rapidly growing pharmaceutical industry had two main 
methods of identifying potential medicines -- the screening of naturally-occurring substances, 
plus the organic molecule synthesis approach pioneered half a century earlier by Bayer and 
Ehrlich.  With each method, pharmaceutical action was ascertained empirically, that is, by 
testing the effects of a molecule on manifestations of disease.  For antibiotic action, tests were 
initially conducted on cultures of bacteria growing in a Petri dish or a test tube -- i.e., in vitro.  
For anesthetic or tranquilizing action, initial tests might be conducted in earthworms.  For blood 
pressure action and the like, the first target would be laboratory mice.   
  For the pharmaceutical industry, the antibiotic revolution also had unexpected negative 
effects.  Penicillin technology was widely diffused to facilitate rapid expansion of wartime 
production.  Waksman obtained patent protection on streptomycin, but licenses were made 
available widely.  Price competition soon emerged and then intensified, driving the prices of 
penicillin and streptomycin down sharply, in some cases, below average production costs.   
Producing the new "wonder drugs" was found to unprofitable.
6 
  Salvation came with new discoveries.  Building upon what had been learned with 
penicillin and streptomycin, the pharmaceutical companies began synthesizing or modifying 
naturally occurring antibiotic molecules to offer a new, more powerful line of antibiotics -- the 
                                                 
5.  On the economic history of antibiotics production, see U.S. Federal Trade Commission (1958) and Kingston 
(1996). 
6.  See U.S. Federal Trade Commission (1958), Chapters 6 and 7. 8 
 
so-called broad-spectrum antibiotics, starting with aureomycin in 1948 and then encompassing 
several molecular variants.  These could be patented, and they were sold for many years at prices 
several multiples of their production costs.  Developing and patenting new pharmaceutical 
entities was found to be a profitable endeavor.  Efforts to discover new and different kinds of 
pharmaceuticals proliferated, precipitating a rapid rise in R&D outlays. 
  The search for new and effective drugs in the 1950s and 1960s was preponderantly 
empirical and intuitive, through the screening of plausible alternative molecules.  Where similar 
molecules had already exhibited therapeutic activity, the screens were typically narrow.   
Investigators tried to identify comparable effects from "me too" molecular variants.  When new 
molecules had no clear therapeutic antecedents, the screens were broad, i.e., covering a panoply 
of possible diseases.  David Schwartzman (1976, p. 60) reports that in 1970, Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association members prepared, extracted, or isolated for medical research 
126,060 substances and tested for pharmacological action some 703,900 substances (many, 
presumably, duplicative), among which only about a thousand showed enough promise to be 
advanced through higher animal tests into human trials.  One company interviewed for an inter-
agency government inquiry put 20,000 compounds through a narrow screen for antibacterial 
activity in 1966 and carried roughly 4,000 into further animal tests because of preliminary 
activity indications.  The cost per individual screening test at that time was on the order of $50, 
while tests on animals such as guinea pigs and monkeys had a reported average cost of $10,000.  
Harbridge House (1967, pp. III-9 and IV-4).  From such screening, sometimes called "random 
screening," companies developed extensive libraries of molecules with annotations on their 
effects, including serendipitous pharmacological activity.  These were available for guidance 
when a search was begun for drugs that combatted a particular new medical problem of interest.   
  Gradually, as medical knowledge accumulated from research in hospitals, academic 
institutions, and industry, the search process narrowed to focus on molecules predicted on 
theoretical grounds to have desired therapeutic effects.  Although earlier antecedents can be 
identified, this "rational drug design" approach is said to have flowered in the 1970s and early 
1980s.  Compare Gambardella (1995, Chapters 2 and 4); and Schwartzman (1996).  A leading 
example was Tagamet, introduced by SmithKlineFrench in the late 1970s.  Scientific research 
had shown that ulcers resulted from excess production of gastric acid in the stomach.  Secretion 9 
 
of the acid was in turn instigated by histamine, an amine naturally present in the human body.  
Search for a therapy against ulcers more effective than traditional antacids such as sodium 
bicarbonate focused on finding agents that would block the acid-generating action of histamine.  
This narrowed the research agenda considerably, although trial-and-error research was still 
needed.  SmithKline-French scientists synthesized and tested roughly 700 compounds over a 
period of ten years before seizing upon the highly successful H2-antagonist Tagamet (chemical 
name, cimetidine).  Its success in turn spurred others to explore molecular variants on Tagamet, 
which was soon surpassed by Glaxo's Zantac and Merck's Pepcid.  These in turn were later 
overtaken by a different proton pump inhibitor approach embodied in Astra's Prilosec.  David 
Schwartzman (1996) argues that the "rational drug design" approach was not as revolutionary a 
break as some claimed it to be, because scientific knowledge provided imperfect guidance and 
much screening of alternative molecules, to be sure, targeted screening, was necessary before 
therapeutically successful molecules were obtained.  His criticism is valid, but it is also true that 
scientific knowledge at least narrowed the searches and limited the use of "try every bottle on the 
shelf" approaches.  Gambardella reports (p. 20) that some 5,000 drugs had to be synthesized for 
early screens to achieve one marketable product and observes (p. 40) that as of the early 1990s, 
"attrition rates ... do not seem to have diminished." 
  A further step forward toward rational drug design came with the perfection of methods 
such as X-ray crystallography and nuclear magnetic resonance imaging for ascertaining the exact 
structure of proteins present in the human body that might serve as targets for hostile agents, and 
also the structure of the invading organisms.
7  One can then try to design therapeutic molecules 
whose three-dimensional profile meshes exactly with receptor sites in the target molecule, often 
a protein, as a key meshes with a lock, and which, having bound to the target, block molecular 
functions or changes adverse to individuals' health.  Here the search narrows to a particular 
structure for the therapeutic agent.  Again, however, empiricism is not eliminated.  Many 
alternative molecules, identified among other ways through computer modelling, might bind to a 
particular target but have no desirable therapeutic effect or be toxic.  Thus, search must continue 
for a molecule with the right configuration and also the desired therapeutic interaction with its 
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target -- a search much less precisely guided by received theory.  For example, in its quest for a 
molecule that combatted the body's rejection of "foreign" kidney, liver, heart, and other tissue 
transplants with less severe side effects than the established inhibitor, cyclosporin, Vertex, a 
startup company pioneering the computer-aided design of therapeutic molecules, explored 367 
different variants before finding one that bound to the receptor site appropriately and showed the 
hoped-for pharmacological effects.
8  As a skeptic of the rational design school observed:
9 
 
  A compound may be brilliantly deigned -- everything absolutely rational, but until that compound 
has been shown not only to do clinically what you want it to do, but to be safe, to be active orally, to stay 
around in the body, and not to give you nightmares, it's not a drug. 
 
  An even newer approach is to use modern genetic methods to identify and synthesize 
therapeutic molecules.  Clinical studies are sometimes able to determine where and how the lack 
of a particular protein (such as insulin, human growth hormone, or erythropoietin) in the human 
body leads to ill health.  Even more recently, using high-speed DNA-sequencing techniques, 
researchers can identify gene sequences which, when present in the human body, increase the 
probability of serious diseases, or alternatively, to isolate the sequences associated with 
individuals who might be expected from heredity or life style to acquire a disease but do not.  
Those DNA sequences usually express specific proteins which underlie the disease mechanism.  
When the absence of a protein is likely to render a person disease-prone, the protein can be 
synthesized by recombinant methods -- e.g., splicing the relevant strand of DNA into E.coli 
bacteria and growing the modified organisms in fermentation cultures.
10  It can then be 
introduced, not always without difficulty, into the relevant organs of the human body.  When a 
specific protein is found to increase the likelihood of disease, proteins or much smaller 
traditional organic molecules can be sought, as under rational drug design, to combat the action 
of those proteins or, as in the methods developed to combat HIV/AIDS, to interfere with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Francis Crick and James Watson ascertaining the structure of DNA. 
8.  See Werth, p. 251. 
9.  Ibid., pp. 215-216, quoting an unnamed Merck vice president. 
10.  The key discovery was made by Stanley Cohen of Stanford University and Herbert Boyer of the University of 
California, San Francisco, during the 1970s.  Three patents on the Cohen-Boyer gene splicing techniques were then 
licensed to hundreds of other organizations. 11 
 
replication of harmful agents within them.  These techniques probably provide paths to disease 
remediation with fewer blind alleys and detours than traditional screening approaches.  However, 
the science is difficult, one cannot be sure whether a particular molecular modification will work 
safely, and the manufacturing techniques tend to be more difficult and error-prone than tried-
and-true "small molecule" processes.  Uncertainty is by no means eliminated. 
  The advance of science and technology has also facilitated new, higher-powered methods 
of molecule screening.
11  Three main methods are of interest.  First, through "combinatorial 
chemistry," fragments of molecules can be treated chemically and combined in a host of different 
ways on a single multi-well micro-titre plate, each well yielding a distinct isomer of some larger 
organic molecule.  The process of generating new and possibly interesting molecules is thereby 
accelerated.  Second, interesting proteins and other organic molecule targets can be arrayed on 
similar plates with numerous wells, to which are added diverse molecular variants of possible 
therapeutic interest.  From these tests and the methods devised to interpret their results, one can 
quickly screen to see which of many therapeutically-interesting formulations bind to the targets.  
What would otherwise be a tedious process of testing for interactions one test tube or Petri dish 
at a time is accelerated in a kind of mass production.
12  Third, as suggested in the previous 
paragraph, the process of DNA-sequencing has been accelerated greatly, bringing the costs of 
sequencing an individual's DNA down to such modest levels that sequencing the DNA or 
fragments thereof for large numbers of individuals has become feasible.  The data gained in this 
way can be mined for disease proclivities and other characteristics of therapeutic interest. 
  This third technique has brought still another possibility onto the horizon.  The typical 
drug does not work in all individuals with a given ailment, and the administration of a drug can 
have adverse side effects in some recipients but not in others.  These variations in drug 
receptivity are undoubtedly related to difference in the subjects' genetic endowments.  The new 
science of "pharmagenomics" seeks to ascertain through large-scale DNA sequencing which 
                                                 
11.  For an excellent lay exposition of the principal advances, see Geoffrey Carr, "The Pharmaceutical Industry," 
special survey, The Economist, Feb. 21, 1998.  See also "New Chips on the Block," The Economist, Dec. 2, 2006, 
pp. 24-26; and "Mining DNA for Biomarkers," Business Week, Sept. 5, 2005, pp. 82-85. 
12.  For a more skeptical analysis of actual results, see Pisano (2006), p. 94. 12 
 
individuals fit into which category.
13  In this way, individual drugs might be prescribed only for 
the individuals who will benefit from them and not be harmed by them, permitting better-
targeted drug therapy.  It is proposed too that pharmagenomic screening might eliminate from 
clinical tests of new drugs the individuals likely to experience no effects or adverse side effects 
and therefore render drug testing processes more precise and less costly.  The methods of 
pharmagenomics are so new that few if any successful applications have been reported.  But 
there are great hopes for them. 
  More generally, the enormous advances that have been made in computer-aided 
structurally-based drug design, low-cost molecular manipulation and screening, DNA screening, 
and recombinant genetics have inspired optimism about the possibility of a new "golden era" of 
pharmaceutical discovery.  But the pot of gold has proved to be elusive.  There have indeed been 
important breakthroughs, but they have been relatively scarce.  As Figure 2 shows, after a burst 
of activity during the mid-1990s, the number of new pharmaceutical chemical entities introduced 
into U.S. medical practice during the late 1990s and early years of the 21st century has been 
stagnant or perhaps even declined.  Three influences are evidently at work.  On one hand, the 
development and introduction of new drugs depletes the inventory of long-established chemical 
possibilities and raises the hurdles a new drug must clear in order to displace already efficacious 
existing drugs.  On the other hand, advances in medical knowledge, laboratory methods, and 
instrumentation open up new possibilities that should in time lead to new and superior drugs.  
But third, the latter dynamics work with substantial lags and a good deal of uncertainty, 
engendering substantial, more or less random, fluctuations in the rate of new drug introduction.  
Optimists believe a golden era of pharmaceutical discovery is coming.  When it will materialize 
is one of the remaining uncertainties. 
 
4. Industry - Academic Science Links 
 
  The evolution of pharmaceutical discovery away from unguided or at best intuitive 
random screening toward rational drug design and biological methods has led to increasingly 
                                                 
13.  See Vernon and Hughen (NBER, 2005).  According to the research director of a biotechnology firm, the human 
genome is believed to contain roughly 5,000 pharmaceutically relevant genes, of which only 47 are targeted by the 
200 best-selling drugs of 2003.  "Fixing the Drugs Pipeline," The Economist, March 13, 2004, p. 37. 13 
 
rich linkages between the work of pharmaceutical companies on the one hand and academic 
science carried out in universities and governmentally-supported research institutes, both in the 
nations where the companies operate and across national boundaries.  This has always been the 
case to some extent.  The early work on sulfa drugs was conducted in German industrial 
laboratories by scientists trained at prominent German universities, which were at the time world 
leaders in chemical research and teaching.  Penicillin moved quickly from the laboratories of 
Oxford University to numerous companies producing in quantity for the war effort.  The first 
oral contraceptive was introduced by the G.D. Searle Company in 1960, a decade before the 
earliest date at which the trend toward rational drug design was said to begin.  But a study by the 
IIT Research Institute (1968, pp. 58-72) for the U.S. National Science Foundation revealed an 
intricate "tree" of scientific discoveries extending back to 1849 that laid a foundation for the 
Searle contraceptive and later improvements.  The more recent changes lie mainly in the richness 
and closeness of the science-industry linkages and the magnitude of the science base on which 
the industry could draw.  In 2003, for example, against the $27 billion of industry R&D 
expenditures within the United States reported by PhRMA members, the federally financed 
National Institutes of Health allocated a nearly equal amount to research intramurally and by 
outside grant recipients, much of it basic, and a considerable but unmeasurable portion of it on 
studies of direct or indirect interest in the discovery of new drugs.  Among the knowledge 
"spillovers" traced by Adams and Clemmons (2006) through scientific journal article citations, 
drugs and biotechnology firms had five times the weighted citation volume from firm to 
university authors as the next most citation-intensive industry and nearly three times the volume 
of company scientist citations from firms to other firms. 
  Iain Cockburn and Rebecca Henderson (2000) studied the histories of the 21 new drugs 
introduced between 1965 and 1992 with the highest over-all therapeutic impact, as judged by 
industry experts.   Among the 21, only five, or 24 percent, were developed with essentially no 
input from public sector research.
14  They contrast their results with an earlier analysis by 
Maxwell and Eckert (1990) concluding that 38 percent of an older sample of drugs were 
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developed without public support.  Cockburn and Eckert divided their sample of 21 into three 
categories -- drugs discovered through essentially random screening, drugs that might be said to 
fall under the rational drug design rubric, and drugs discovered through fundamental science.  
All but one of the drugs in the latter two groups built upon key enabling discoveries from public 
science, while four of the seven random screening drugs did not have clear public science 
antecedents.  For 18 drugs in the Cockburn-Henderson sample on which requisite timing data 
were available, the lag from the key enabling discovery to synthesis of an effective drug was 
17.3 years, with a median value of 12.5 years, a minimum of two years, and a maximum lag of 
54 years.  Although public sector research played a seminal role in facilitating high-impact 
drugs, 14 of the 18 drugs on which information was available were first synthesized or, for 
naturally-occurring substances, dug up, by private-sector firms.  Plainly, a division of labor 
exists.  Academic groups have comparative advantage in advancing the science underlying drug 
discovery and pharmaceutical companies excel at manipulating molecules into a form suitable 
for therapeutic use.
15 
  Edwin Mansfield (1998) pursued a more aggregate approach toward identifying the 
importance of academic research to private-sector companies' innovations.  He obtained from 
research and development laboratory heads in some 77 companies, operating in seven broad 
fields of technology, estimates of the percentage of their new products introduced during two 
time periods, 1975-85 and 1986-94, that "could not have been developed (without substantial 
delay) in the absence of recent academic research."  For all fields, the average research-
dependence fraction was 10 percent for the earlier innovations and 11 percent for the later group.  
"Drugs and medical products" had by far the highest average research-dependence ratio -- 27 
percent for the earlier period and 31 percent for the later period.  Supplementing the "could not 
have been developed" cohort, 13 to 17 percent of the drug and medical product innovations 
received "very substantial aid" from recent academic research -- a virtual tie with "information 
processing" for first place among the seven groups.  With his "recent" framing question, 
Mansfield found that the average lag from key academic research results to commercialization in 
drugs and medicines was 8.5 to 8.8 years.   
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  Academic science is transformed into pharmaceutical innovations through richly 
interconnected networks.
16  Open science, to be sure, is available to pharmaceutical companies 
through journal articles and presentations at professional meetings.  But in addition, there are 
tighter links.  Pharmaceutical companies provide financial support for academic researchers, and 
their staffs sometimes perform joint research with academic researchers and co-author articles 
with them.  They also enter into cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) 
with government laboratories such as the U.S. National Institutes of Health, permitting joint 
research, joint publication, and (under the Stevenson-Wydler Act of 1980) assignment of 
resulting patents to the companies.  In recent years, many pharma companies have opened new 
laboratories in the vicinity of top academic research institutions in order to facilitate cooperation.  
Quick absorption of the newest scientific discoveries is facilitated when traditional 
pharmaceutical companies support their own active programs of basic research.  In 1993, for 
example, drug companies reported that 13.6 percent of their total company-financed research and 
development budgets was devoted to basic research, as defined by the National Science 
Foundation -- 18 percent of the basic research spending of all industries covered by the National 
Science Foundation survey for that year.  For the average research-performing company across 
all industries, basic research was 7.3 percent of total company-financed R&D spending.
17   
  Even closer links between academia and industry are seen in the emergence of hundreds 
of small new biotech firms, which tend to locate near academic centers, have academic scientists 
as their founding entrepreneurs, and count numerous distinguished academic researchers as 
members of their boards of directors and/or scientific advisory councils.  Traditional "Big 
Pharma" companies in turn license molecules discovered in biotech startups for later-stage 
commercial development or, with increasing frequency, acquire the biotech companies outright, 
securing full ownership rights in their development "pipeline" molecules and adding staff 
associated with them to their own R&D staffs.  See Kettler (2000).  In this way they augment 
their inventories of interesting drug development candidates, among other things filling voids 
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created when more traditional drug discovery approaches have yielded disappointing results. 
  An indication of the extent to which firms introducing new drugs to the U.S. market 
depended upon others for early-stage discoveries is provided through a study undertaken by the 
author.  For the five years 2001-05, the Food and Drug Administration's web site listing new 
medical entities approved for marketing during those years was searched.  From information 
provided in the approval lists, the patents claimed by the drug developers as impediments to 
generic competition could be traced by searching the FDA's so-called "Orange Book."   On the 
85 new medical entities for which patent information was disclosed,
18 251 applicable patents 
were found, or an average of 2.95 patents per molecule.  Altogether, 47 percent of the patents 
were assigned at the time of their issue to companies with names different from (abstracting from 
obvious name changes due to large-company mergers) the company authorized by the FDA to 
begin commercial marketing of the sample drugs.
19  Patents issued in the earlier stages of 
development, i.e., prior to January 2000, were more likely (54 percent) to be assigned originally 
to firms other than FDA approval recipients than patents issued in later years (38.4 percent).  The 
difference is statistically significant.  Evidently, the companies carrying out final-stage 
development and testing relied disproportionately upon outsiders for early-stage discovery.     
Among the 251 patents, 10.4 percent went to essentially academic institutions, i.e., universities, 
hospitals, and independent research institutes.  Seven percent went to universities, although a 
handful of the university assignments were joint with other institutions, including U.S. 
government laboratories.  Seven of the 251 patents had multiple organizational assignees and ten 
had only individual inventors as assignees. Many of the non-academic patent assignees were 
biotech companies, although an exact breakdown was not possible because information on 
companies that have not yet "gone public" is scarce.  It cannot be ruled out that at least some of 
the assignees with names different from that of the company receiving FDA approval had 
common stock partially or wholly controlled by larger corporate parents, notably, the companies 
receiving FDA approvals. 
  In an analysis covering an earlier and longer period, DiMasi (2000, p. 1177) found that 
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38.2 percent of the 691 new chemical entities approved in the United States between 1963 and 
1999 originated from sources other than the company seeking FDA approval.  For his sample, 
outside sources accounted for 28.4 percent of 1963-1969 NCEs and 39.1 percent of NCEs 
approved in the 1990s.  This plus the results described in the previous paragraph suggest a rising 
trend in reliance upon outside discovery. 
  That drug discovery has become more science-based and hence more efficient, as argued 
by Gambardella (1995), might be consistent with a remarkable result in the relevant literature 
that, at least at the time this was written, had no clear explanation.  A research team at Tufts 
University has published two leading empirical analyses of new drug discovery and clinical 
testing costs.  The first focused on 93 new chemical entities introduced into human testing 
between 1970 and 1982; the second on 68 NCEs first tested between 1983 and 1994.  See 
DiMasi et al. (1991, 2003).  Detailed data were obtained from ten to twelve pharmaceutical 
companies, and a consistent methodology was applied to allocate the costs of clinical trial 
failures to drugs that eventually succeeded in gaining approval and also to make the more 
difficult allocations of pre-clinical research costs to successful molecules.  All entities in the 
sample were "self-originated," which means that the responsible companies did not license or 
buy discovered molecules from other companies, and hence presumably incurred the costs of 
discovery internally.  The fraction of total constant-dollar pre-clinical outlays as a percentage of 
total pre-clinical plus clinical testing outlays, without adjustment for the cost of capital invested 
in the research, was as follows: 
 
  1970-82  cohort   57.7  percent 
  1983-94  cohort   30.0  percent 
 
The decrease is remarkable.
20  One possible explanation is that drug discovery became more 
sharply focused and hence consumed a much smaller fraction of total R&D outlays.  Another 
possibility is that in the later period prototypes, even if not actual molecules, were licensed in 
from outside science-based laboratories, although presumably this should have been ruled out by 
the sample design.  A third possibility entails sampling variation or measurement error, although 
the differences seem too large to be explained in that manner alone.  A fourth alternative is that 18 
 
for some reason clinical trial costs exploded during the later time period.  We turn to that 
possibility now, although it must be admitted that an important mystery cannot be resolved here. 
 
5. Clinical Testing Costs and Regulation 
 
  Since 1938, when the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 was amended after approximately 
one hundred persons were killed by sulfanilamide adulterated with poisonous diethylene glycol 
(used in antifreeze), the interstate sale of new drugs was prohibited in the United States unless 
the would-be drug provider obtained a safety certification (a New Drug Approval, or NDA) from 
the Food and Drug Administration.  The FDA's powers were quite limited, and new drugs were 
often introduced into the market with claims of efficacy that were based on evidence that was 
more impressionistic than scientific.  A demand for more stringent regulation emerged when 
thalidomide, a drug intended for use to combat morning sickness in pregnant women, caused 
severe birth defects in many infants born of women taking the drug.  In Europe, where 
thalidomide had entered general use, some 8,000 malformed babies were victims; in the United 
States, there were only nine known cases.  The U.S. Congress honored the FDA officer who had 
sidestepped regulations to keep thalidomide testing at low volumes in the United States, and in 
1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Act to reform drug approval processes.  It required 
the FDA to ensure that new drugs were not only safe, but also that they were efficacious, i.e., 
that they actually had the therapeutic effects their makers claimed.  An earlier loophole allowing 
full-scale marketing if the FDA did not act within 180 days of an application's filing was 
eliminated.  The FDA in turn issued new regulations requiring that pharmaceutical producers 
seeking approval for their new drugs follow a strict regimen of clinical testing that adhered to 
scientifically grounded sample design, experimental control, and statistical inference norms.   
Among other things, the three-phase approach to clinical testing was introduced, and in Phase 
III, double-blind testing against a placebo became "the gold standard" for FDA oversight. 
  By the late 1960s, a hue and cry arose asserting that the new rules had drastically 
increased testing costs and that the number of new chemical entities receiving FDA approval had 
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in turn been sharply reduced.
21  Four reasonably well contrived clinical trial cost estimates, all 
attempting to pro-rate the cost of testing molecules dropped at diverse clinical test phases, 
provide an overview of what happened.
22  All of the estimates are converted to year 2000 price 
levels using the gross domestic product implicit deflator: 
 
 Source    Test  Period  Average  Out-of-Pocket   
      Cost  per  Approved 
      N e w   C h e m i c a l   E n t i t y
23 
 
 Mansfield   Late  1950s   $5.4  million 
  Clymer    Late 1960s               $40.2 million 
  DiMasi I    1970-early 1980s        $65.7 million 
  DiMasi II    1983-late 1990s          $282 million 
 
 
There are two striking increases.  The first is from the pre-1962 to the post-1962 period, as the 
Kefauver-Harris Act took hold, with estimates based in both cases on data from a single 
pharmaceutical firm, SmithKlineFrench.
24  The second, derived using a methodology consistent 
between periods, is for drugs entered into testing during the 1970s, as compared to those on 
which clinical testing began in 1983 or later. 
  Grabowski et al. (1978) took advantage of a natural experiment to explore the reasons for 
the first apparent cost increase.  In the United States, proof of efficacy was required after 1962; 
in Great Britain, proof of efficacy was added to the approval standard only in 1971.  Between 
1960-61 and 1966-70, inflation-adjusted drug development costs in Great Britain increased by a 
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factor of three while they increased in the United States by six times.  This result suggests that 
the change in regulatory regimes in the United States was responsible for a twofold cost increase, 
with the rest attributable to other factors such as fear of tort liability (following substantial 
thalidomide damages paid by Continental European firms) and companies' desire to differentiate 
new drugs from the large number of entities already on the market. 
  What happened to cause a fourfold increase in price-level-adjusted clinical tests between 
the third and fourth samples remains, like the reason for the sharp relative fall in pre-clinical 
outlays, a mystery.  The FDA did continue to strengthen its clinical evidence rules, in part as a 
reaction to further safety shortfalls.  As the number of molecules competing to be prescribed 
against the typical disease increased, companies sometimes found it advantageous on marketing 
grounds to conduct more Phase III and Phase IV tests than the FDA required.  It is also possible 
that the gross domestic product deflators used to render outlays comparable in terms of 
purchasing power are inappropriate for measuring inflation of R&D costs, both generally and in 
pharmaceuticals.  Some R&D costs, e.g., for computer capabilities, rose much less than the rate 
of general inflation, and improvements in scientific apparatus sometimes made it possible to 
carry out experiments that would have been impossible, in effect, infinitely expensive, 
previously.  However, other costs, and especially the costs of clinical testing, may have risen 
much more rapidly than the rate of general inflation.  Clinical testing is a labor-intensive activity, 
and the wages of physicians, nurses, and related staff increased more rapidly than the GDP 
deflator.  Much clinical testing is done in hospitals.  The average cost per day of hospitalization 
rose at an average rate of 11 percent per year between 1970 and 1990 while the GDP deflator 
rose at 5.8 percent. It is also possible, although no research on the matter is known, that hospitals 
using clinical testing activities as a "profit center" dumped some of their soaring overhead costs 
into the charges they levied on deep-pocketed pharmaceutical companies for clinical testing.  
And of course, sampling error cannot be ruled out.  The DiMasi et al. samples are weighted in 
favor of large pharmaceutical companies targeting their new drugs toward long-term therapy 
markets able to bear heavy testing costs and requiring extensive proof of long-term safety.   
Drugs aimed at acute but rare diseases are probably undersampled.
25 
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  Seeking to control their clinical testing costs or minimize internal bureaucracy, 
pharmaceutical companies have "outsourced" some of their clinical test tasks to independent 
contract research organizations (CROs) that specialize in test management, and more recently, 
they have sought to conduct tests in low-wage nations to the extent permitted by regulatory 
agency rules.
26  (The U.S. FDA requires that some clinical trials be conducted within the United 
States.)  Azoulay (2003) calculated that on average, pharmaceutical companies covered by a 
large survey outsourced to CROs 23 percent of their clinical test activity on average in 1999.  He 
found too that outsourcing is most frequent for Phase IV trials, and that in earlier-phase trials, 
use of CROs is less common for tests and disease indications that require complex protocols and 
quick feedback from unexpected events than for relatively routine testing.  In a possible 
reversion to practices abandoned in the 1970s, pharmaceutical companies have also reconsidered 
using prisoners in late-stage clinical trials.
27 
 
6. The Decision-Theoretic Problem 
 
  Evaluating the results of clinical trials is a classic exercise in statistical decision theory.  
The Food and Drug Administration in the United States, and in the European Community since 
1995, the European Medicines Agency, attempt to keep unsafe products off the market and to 
approve only products that can demonstrate their therapeutic efficacy.  Because drugs have 
differing activity in diverse humans,  clinical test results are statistically noisy.  Decision-makers 
for both the sponsoring company and the regulatory agency must try to sort out the true effects 
from the random variation.  One must be wary of both Type I errors -- concluding that the drug is 
                                                                                                                                                             
al. (1995).  The highest average costs were for non-steroidal anti-inflammatories, which are often taken several 
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entities approved between 2001 and 2005, 89 percent of the orphan drugs, i.e., those treating diseases affecting 
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designated "priority."   
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safe and/or efficacious when it is not, and Type II errors -- keeping a drug off the market when it 
actually will do good work.  Tradeoffs are also required.  Virtually every drug has some adverse 
side effects.  Even century-old aspirin does; it can trigger ulcers, inhibit blood-clotting, and 
(more rarely) cause fatal Reye's syndrome.  One must weigh the beneficial effects against the 
adverse effects, neither measured with certainty. 
  For the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the "gold standard" again has been the 
double-blind test of a new drug against placebos, e.g., sugar pills.  It is not always required, 
however.  Denying an available potential remedy to patients with an otherwise fatal disease 
violates ethical canons, so the U.S. FDA either allows new drugs to be tested on all clinical trial 
subjects (e.g., in the early years of the HIV/AIDS crisis) or uses as a comparative benchmark a 
drug whose therapeutic efficacy has already been established.  It has been argued, e.g., by Angell 
(2004), that, when they are available, established drugs should normally be used as the 
benchmark for comparison, because in a head-to-head competition, information may be 
generated that helps physicians choose among alternative therapies by comparing cost with 
benefits.  This is not always a good idea, however.  The largest trial of Merck's Cox-2 inhibitor 
pain reliever Vioxx was against an established over-the-counter drug, naproxen sodium (branded 
Naprosyn).  The latter was known to have blood-thinning properties which reduce the severity or 
likelihood of strokes and heart attacks.  When clinical trial subjects were found to have a higher 
propensity toward adverse cardiovascular events with Vioxx than with naproxen sodium, the 
inference was drawn that naproxen sodium was having its well-known positive effect, and not 
that Vioxx was actually causing cardiac events.  This was eventually found to be wrong, and 
when Vioxx was taken off the market in 2004, a torrent of tort litigation followed.  An equally 
large trial against a placebo might have identified the adverse side effects from Vioxx more 
clearly, but left unclear Vioxx's superior record in avoiding ulcers as compared to naproxen 
sodium. 
  The decision-theoretic problems of clinical trial design are illustrated by the case of TPA 
(tissue plasminogen activator), a genetically engineered drug targeted against the blood clots that 
accompany heart attacks, versus an older, well-established drug, streptokinase (SKA).
28  The null 
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hypothesis on efficacy would be that TPA was not more effective than a placebo or, under an 
alternative standard, than SKA.  Carefully structured trials were conducted, and it was found that 
6.3 percent of the subjects died after being injected with TPA plus heparin, while 7.4 percent 
died with SKA plus heparin.  Assuming these values to reflect the true states of nature, Figure 4 
shows how the statistical inference problem might evolve.  The solid lines show the probability 
distribution of possible trial outcomes with samples of 1,000 on each alternative -- fairly typical 
of the Phase III sample sizes required during the early 1990s by the U.S. FDA.  If the death rate 
with a placebo exceeded 8 percent, trials with 1,000 TPA injections would with high probability 
support a decision to allow marketing of TPA.  The risk of a  Type I error is quite small -- the 
area under the right-hand tail of the TPA distribution above 8 percent.  But the test would be 
insufficient to tell whether TPA was more effective than SKA.  If both drugs were matched 
against each other, there would be roughly one chance in three that SKA would be found to be 
superior when in fact it is inferior.  Recognizing this, TPA's developer, the biotech firm 
Genentech, chose to sponsor head-to-head clinical trials with much larger samples than those 
required by the FDA.  With samples of 10,000, we see in Figure 4, there is only a small 
probability, measured by the proportional area under the overlap between the two dash-dash 
density functions, that one would err in concluding that TPA is not superior to SKA.  With this 
evidence, TPA became the drug of choice for emergency treatment of heart attack and stroke 
patients, even with a TPA price ten times the price at which SKA was marketed. 
  Similar problems pervade testing for adverse side effects.  Many side effects are rare 
events, occurring with probabilities less than 0.01.  A 12-week-long trial of Vioxx, for example, 
yielded only about 1.2 heart attack cases per thousand subjects, suggesting a probability (that 
undoubtedly would have risen with longer therapy) of 0.0012.
29  With the sample sizes typically 
required by the Food and Drug Administration, determining whether Vioxx actually caused heart 
attacks or whether the relatively few cases observed would have happened in any event was 
intrinsically difficult.   
  Given these difficulties, policy-makers and company officials may wish to commence 
full-scale marketing of a new drug, expecting that rare side effects will reveal themselves when 
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the population using the drug numbers in the hundreds of thousands or millions.  There are, 
however, two main problems with this approach.  When adverse effects are rare, physicians 
administering the drug to their typically small number of patients will seldom be able to discern 
that observed complications were caused by the drug rather than something that would have 
happened in any event.  And, busy as they are, they are unlikely to take the trouble to report the 
event to a central office processing data on the entire population.  Given this, extraordinary 
diligence is required on the part of the agency responsible for overseeing drug safety, piecing 
together fragments of imperfect information from the field into a more coherent picture. 
  But here the wrong thing happened in the United States.  The drug evaluation problem is 
sufficiently difficult that the U.S. FDA took a long time making its decisions, once companies 
had deposited truckloads of clinical test information on its doorstep.  During the 1980s, the time 
required for the FDA to make a definitive decision on companies' requests for a New Drug 
Approval averaged roughly 30 months.  There were complaints of a "drug lag" relative to nations 
with less meticulous drug approval systems, and companies claimed that the regulation-induced 
delay of profitable sales impaired their incentives to sustain R&D efforts. 
  A solution to the problem was adopted by the U.S. Congress in the Prescription Drug 
User Fee Act (PDUFA) of 1992.  It allowed the FDA to levy user fees upon pharmaceutical 
companies, in part with a fee per application, partly through a fee proportional to the number of 
production sites licensed, and partly with fees rising with the number of new drug applications 
approved.  The fees, eventually exceeding $250 million per year, allowed the FDA to augment 
its new drug evaluation staff, in exchange for which it promised to reduce its decision-making 
lags to an average of 12 months.
30  The approval-linked component had potentially undesirable 
incentive effects, for the more drugs the FDA approved, the higher its revenues would be.  Thus, 
it might be motivated to approve marginal drugs it would not favor if their approval did not yield 
additional revenue.  The law was modified in 1997 to eliminate this incentive incompatibility by 
targeting an annual lump sum to be raised from drug approvals, with a higher resultant fee per 
NDA, the fewer NDAs issued.  Even so, another difficulty materialized.  Congress made it clear 
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that the FDA was not to divert the PDUFA revenues to activities other than new drug review, 
and when insufficient funds were separately appropriated to support all previously existing FDA 
functions, the FDA cut back on the resources it devoted to post-marketing surveillance.  Its 
monitoring of post-marketing safety issues abated and responses to lethal side effects from 
already-approved drugs were delayed.  Guided in part by a critical report from the Institute of 
Medicine (2006) of the National Academies of Science, corrective action was begun after the 
Vioxx crisis surfaced. 
 
7. Uncertainty Revisited 
 
  A recurrent theme in this essay has been the presence of uncertainty.  As the research and 
testing process progresses, uncertainties are gradually mitigated.  Several sources put the number 
of alternative molecules subjected to early screening at between 4,000 and 10,000 in order to 
have a single approved drug at the end of the process.
31  According to PhRMA (2006, p. 4), the 
U.S. industry association, a single approved drug emerges on average from five compounds 
entering clinical testing, 250 molecules subjected to animal and other laboratory tests, and 5,000 
to 10,000 molecules initially screened.  As the number of drug candidates is winnowed, the costs 
of continued testing and hence the stakes in the game escalate. 
  Even when marketing approval is secured, risks do not vanish.  As we have seen, severe 
safety hazards may become evident only when a drug has been accepted widely on the market.  
And approval is by no means synonymous with commercial success.  Grabowski and Vernon 
(1990, 1994) have shown that the distribution of quasi-rents -- that is, the surplus of revenues 
over variable production costs for individual drugs -- is highly skew.  Among any given 100 
drugs introduced into the market, the top ten by number realize from 48 to 55 percent of their 
cohort's quasi-rents, while the least lucrative 80 out of 100 barely cover, or less than cover, their 
average capitalized research and testing costs.  In its skewness, the profitability distribution for 
new drugs is similar to the distributions for most other new products, except that when one 
focuses only on approved drugs, one ignores the uncertainties that preceded approval and 
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p. 4). 26 
 
therefore obtains somewhat less skew outcome distributions than with samples that begin at 
earlier stages of the research and product innovation cycle.  See Harhoff and Scherer (2000).  
Skewness of the distribution of rewards from innovation in turn makes it more difficult to hedge 
against risk by maintaining a portfolio of projects -- a standard feature of high-technology 
investment strategies.  Scherer and Harhoff (2000) demonstrate, for example, in a simulation 
analysis of the Grabowski-Vernon data, that even averaging over all the products introduced into 
the U.S. market for a total of 21 years, skewness and the random appearance of a few extreme 
values lead to fluctuations in overall annual industry gross profitability of  25 percent.  In other 
words, the overall industry portfolio is insufficiently diverse to eliminate significant profit 
variations. 
  To be sure, pharmaceutical companies have some bases for predicting before marketing 
begins whether their new drug will enter a market with blockbuster potential or a niche in which 
quasi-rents will at best be modest.  Among other things, first movers typically enjoy larger 
market shares than latecomers.
32  However, there are also surprises.  The drug with the highest 
annual sales in pharmaceutical industry history, Lipitor (atorvastatin), was seen by its developers 
as at best a late entrant into the cholesterol-reducing statins drug market.  With limited perceived 
prospects, the Lipitor project was on the verge of cancellation by its developer, Warner-Lambert, 
when a small clinical trial revealed, contrary to expectations, that it was more effective at given 
dosages than rival drugs.
33  Confirmation of this result plus a marketing decision to set Lipitor's 
price at half the price of the leading rival propelled Lipitor's sales to record levels, ahead of 
several competing molecules.  Similarly, Abbott Laboratories' Hytrin (terazosin) was synthesized 
through a minor manipulation -- the replacement of two pentane ring double bonds with single 
bonds in a quadruple-ring molecule -- of an anti-hypertensive drug marketed by Pfizer.  Its 
performance as an anti-hypertensive was unimpressive.  But tests by academic researchers 
revealed serendipitously that Hytrin could ease the symptoms of benign prostate gland 
enlargement.  It was retested for that use and approved, achieving annual sales in its category 
approaching a billion dollars per year  -- a result far beyond the expectations of the team that 
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created it.  On the other hand, drugs with the most optimistic prospects sometimes prove to have 
unacceptable side effects, crashing and burning after hundreds of millions of dollars have been 
spent for development and testing.
34 
 
8. The Unique Role of Patents 
 
  The expectation of patent protection on new products plays a particularly important role 
in pharmaceutical R&D decision-making.  Levin et al. (1987) surveyed 650 corporate R&D 
managers, asking them inter alia to evaluate on a scale of 1 (not at all effective) to 7 (very 
effective) the effectiveness of patents as a means of protecting the competitive advantages from 
new products.  From 17 pharmaceutical industry respondents, the average score was 6.53, 
compared to a response-weighted average of 4.33 for all 130 surveyed lines of business.  Among 
the industries with more than one respondent, pharmaceuticals ranked second in its patent 
protection effectiveness score.  This result is consistent with the findings of Edwin Mansfield et 
al. (1986), who asked the top R&D executives of 100 U.S. corporations what fraction of the 
inventions they commercialized between 1981 and 1983 would not have been developed in the 
absence of patent protection.  For pharmaceuticals, the average was 60 percent; for all industries, 
14 percent. 
  The importance of patents to pharmaceutical R&D decision-makers stems not only from 
the large average investments in a typical new product and the many uncertainties lining the path 
to a new product approval.  The differentiating factor is seen among other things through a 
comparison with another industry -- aircraft -- that taps a range of highly sophisticated 
technologies and spends billions of dollars developing the typical new product.  For aircraft 
(both civilian and military), the average "effectiveness of product patents" score in the Levin et 
al. survey was 3.79 -- in the lowest third among 130 industry categories. 
  The key difference lies in the relative ease of imitation, i.e., how difficult it would be, 
with vs. without patent protection, for new product imitators to launch their own competing 
products.  Even without patents, the firm that would seek to imitate the Boeing 787 would have 
to build its own scale models, perform wind tunnel tests, compile detailed engineering drawings 
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and specifications for all structural parts, work out electronic system interfaces, construct full-
scale test models, test them for structural soundness and aerodynamic performance, and much 
else, spending very nearly as much as Boeing did to develop its 787.  Presumably, it would have 
observed Boeing's design before undertaking the project, and by the time the imitator completed 
its developmental work, Boeing would be a decade ahead in sales and have progressed far down 
its learning curve, enjoying a substantial production cost advantage.  But in pharmaceutical 
discovery and testing, much of the R&D is aimed at securing knowledge:  knowledge of which 
molecules are therapeutically interesting, knowledge of which molecules work in animals, and 
most costly, knowledge as to whether a target drug is safe and efficacious in human beings.  
Once that knowledge is accumulated, absent patent protection, it is essentially there as a public 
good available to any interested party.  Achieving it requires by recent U.S. standards an 
investment measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars.  But for most new drugs, and 
especially small-molecule drugs,
35 a would-be generic imitator could spend a few million dollars 
on process engineering and enter the market with an exact knock-off copy.  Generic entry in turn 
could quickly erode the quasi-rents anticipated by a pharmaceutical innovator to repay its R&D 
investment.  Hence the importance attributed to patents by drug companies. 
  This asymmetry between pharmaceutical innovators and imitators was not nearly as 
glaring during the early 1980s.  Because of FDA and Supreme Court rulings, generic drug 
providers had to invest nearly as much per molecule in clinical testing to obtain marketing 
approval as the first-moving innovator.
36  Original developers also had problems.  They typically 
sought patent protection just before beginning human tests, when probable "utility" could be 
documented, and at the completion of those tests, 30-month average decision-making lags at the 
FDA ate into the 17-year period over which their products were protected by patents.  A grand 
compromise on these two points was achieved in the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984.
37  It allowed 
                                                                                                                                                             
2006; and Joe Nocera, "The Dangers of Swinging for the Fences," New York Times, Jan. 27, 2007, p. B1. 
35.  I.e., abstracting from biologicals, whose production tends to be more difficult and to entail more secret "black 
art."  
36.  See Kitch (1973) and Bond and Lean (1977).  A key Supreme Court ruling was U.S. v. Generix Drug Corp. et 
al., 460 U.S. 453 (1983). 
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patent holders to extend the lives of their patents, compensating for at least some of the period 
during which their new product introduction was delayed by regulatory oversight.  It 
simultaneously reduced the clinical testing requirements for generic entrants once blocking 
patents had expired.  Contrary to past precedents, the so-called Bolar Amendment also permitted 
generic drug developers to produce small quantities of the drug in question for their clinical trials 
before the drug's patents had expired so that they could complete their FDA paperwork and 
attempt entry as soon as patents expired.  The generic entry provisions had a more dramatic 
impact, increasing the number of prescriptions filled generically in the United States from 19 
percent in 1984 to 51 percent in the year 2003.  The expectation of rapid generic entry following 
patent expiration in turn reinforced the incentive of pharmaceutical innovators to invigorate their 
R&D to compensate for impending profit losses. 
 
9. Profitability and Research Investments 
 
  With strong patent protection and well-differentiated products, pharmaceutical producers 
enjoy considerable discretion over the prices they set.  Insurance coverage of drug outlays, 
expanded rapidly during the 1980s, reduced demand elasticities and conferred even more pricing 
power.  One index for measuring pricing power is the price-cost margin (PCM), defined as: 
 
  PCM =     Sales - Material Costs - In-Plant Payroll Costs 
                                      Sales 
 
For 459 four-digit manufacturing industries on which data were published for the year 1987, 
pharmaceuticals had the sixth-highest margin, at 61.4 percent.  For all manufacturing industries, 
the average PCM was 30.5 percent.  Similarly, for decades pharmaceutical producers appeared at 
or near the top of Fortune magazine's annual list of broad industry groups, ranked in order of 
after-tax profit returns as a percentage of stockholders' equity.  In 27 of the years 1968-2006, it 
ranked either first or second among from 22 to 50 broad industry groups.  Beginning already in 
the late 1950s, the drug makers were accused in public fora of profiteering at the expense of 
consumers.  They argued in return that high profits were a reward for superior innovation and a 
necessary spur to investment in risky R&D. 
  Another more subtle defense led, after considerable repetition, to a large-scale analytic 30 
 
investigation by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1994).  The basic argument was 
that, due to the R&D-intensity of pharmaceutical manufacturing and peculiarities in the way 
accepted accounting principles dealt with R&D outlays, reported profit returns on drug company 
assets and stockholders' equity were systematically overstated.  Specifically, R&D outlays were 
recorded as a current year's expense when in fact they were investments yielding returns over 
decades following their incurrence.  Ideally, they should be added to asset accounts and then 
depreciated only slowly.  Ignoring their investment character understated drug company assets 
and hence, given the absolute R&D magnitudes and growth conditions experienced by drug 
companies, overstated profit ratios in which assets or stockholders' equity comprised the 
denominator.
38   A careful evaluation by the Office of Technology Assessment confirmed the 
validity of the underlying theory and concluded that, after appropriate accounting adjustments 
were made, pharmaceutical makers enjoyed returns on investment only two or three percentage 
points higher than the roughly ten percent real cost of their financial capital.
39  And at least part 
of that differential could be attributed to the riskiness of drug companies' investments.
40  In other 
words, drug companies did not appear to be realizing extraordinary supra-normal profit returns. 
  This conclusion left unsettled the specific behavioral dynamics that reconciled unusually 
high price-cost margins, atypically high R&D/sales ratios, and bottom-line returns on investment 
only moderately above all-industry norms.  Several studies of the links between profit potential 
and R&D investment have been published.  I focus here on my own analysis, which has been 
brought as up-to-date as data availability permitted.
41  The profit potential is measured from U.S. 
Census data for the "pharmaceutical preparations" industry as sales less materials purchases less 
in-plant payroll costs (including fringe benefits).  Call this variable "gross margins."  The data 
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were adjusted for inflation to a 1992 = 100 price level base using the implicit GDP deflator.  The 
coverage is for 1962 through 2004.
42  R&D data were spliced from various statistical reports of 
the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America and PhRMA.  On the assumption that U.S. 
members allocated resources internationally to the most favorable locations and that overseas 
R&D was influenced by profit prospects in the firms' largest single market, the United States, the 
R&D data include "R&D abroad" as well as domestic R&D.
43  Again, deflation was to 1992 
price levels.  For each deflated time series, an exponential growth trend was fitted using least-
squares regression.  For the gross margins variable, the average "real" rate of growth was 4.84 
percent per year; for the R&D variable, 8.11 percent.  Using the fitted trend, percentage 
deviations from the trend were computed.  These are plotted in Figure 5, with margin deviations 
as a solid line and R&D deviations as a dotted line. 
  For at least the first three decades of the time series, the degree of coincidence is 
remarkable.  When margins rise relative to trend, R&D rises in near tandem.  The causation 
cannot plausibly run from R&D to margins, because R&D extends for a decade or so before 
marketing begins, and even then, it takes several years before sales and margins peak.  The 
turning points are roughly coincident for the mid-1960s and the early 1990s, but R&D leads 
margins by three years for the early 1980s.  Reconciliation might come from viewing margins as 
an imperfectly anticipated measure of profit expectations.  Or companies might apply with some 
deviation a crude rule of thumb, raising R&D when margins increase and holding back its 
growth when their growth flags.  The relationships appear to break down during the 1990s and 
early years of the new century.  A possible explanation is that during the early 1990s, companies 
were under heavy pressure from the Clinton administration to curb their prices or face price 
controls.  They argued against such policies, emphasizing the dependence of R&D investments 
on profits, and may have found it politic visibly to maintain R&D growth levels.  Margin 
deviations rose sharply under a new and more conservative U.S. president, while a slight decline 
in R&D growth may have been due to disappointing new product approvals.  Compare Figure 2. 
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  Whatever the exact causal dynamics, two things appear clear:  (1)  Correctly accounting 
for R&D as a long-lived investment tends to reduce substantially, if not to eliminate altogether, 
the inference that pharmaceutical companies are on average achieving supra-normal profit 
returns.  And (2), there are distinct links, both short-run and long-run, between gross margins and 
R&D investments.  One possible theoretical explanation is that pharmaceutical companies are 
adhering to the Dorfman-Steiner (1954) theorem, which states that profit-maximizing 
investments in R&D (and also in drug promotion activity, generating nearly as much expenditure 
as R&D) are higher, the wider price-cost margins are.  But under Dorfman-Steiner, one would 
not expect the nearly complete dissipation of profit margins for R&D and promotion.
44  An 
explanation in better accord with the evidence and consistent with received theory
45 is that 
pharmaceutical companies engage in competitive rent-seeking behavior -- to be sure, of a 
virtuous character distinguishable from what some early theories emphasized.  That is, when 
rents (price-cost margins) are high, the companies compete vigorously to capture them by 
increasing their R&D (and promotional) outlays, and indeed, the companies compete so 
vigorously, there is little left over in the end for supra-normal profit.  When rents decline, R&D 
outlays are also squeezed so that a competitive rate of return persists. 
  Exactly how this competitive rent-seeking evolves is left unclear.  One possibility is that 
Firm A sees Firm B mounting an R&D project to develop new drug X, whereupon B initiates its 
own countervailing project to offer a variant of X and perhaps even to preempt B's innovation 
date.  Cockburn and Henderson (1995) call such competition "racing" and, through interviews 
and an analysis of research focus data from pharmaceutical companies, find little support for it.  
Rather, they perceive investment decisions to be driven by the appearance of new technological 
opportunities and allocated among R&D laboratories on the basis of the firms' heterogeneous 
human capital capabilities.  In this case, the more plausible chain of causation is that new 
science-based opportunities create profit potentials, and, recognizing them sooner or later, 
companies compete vigorously to exploit them, in the process dissipating most or all of the 
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10. Implications for Economic Welfare  
 
  To the extent that these insights are anywhere near the mark, implications for economic 
welfare follow.   
  A simple version of the rent-seeking phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 6.  Through 
research and development, a new product is created.  Its existence gives rise to a new demand 
curve D* that did not exist before, and through process R&D (which we have touched only 
lightly in previous sections) a (constant) marginal production cost function M-MC* appears.  
With a patent monopoly limited in time, the responsible firm maximizes its profits by setting 
marginal revenue MR equal to marginal cost, quoting price OP* and offering output OQ*.   
During the on-patent period the firm realizes quasi-rents, also called producer's surplus, 
measured by the rectangular area P*WXM. This producer's surplus represents a welfare gain, 
and its expectation motivates investment in forward-looking R&D.  In addition, the availability 
of the new product yields consumers' surplus measured by the triangular area P*WZ.  When the 
patent expires, generic competition begins (before 1984, slowly), prices are driven to marginal 
cost OM, and output expands to OQC, giving rise to an additional surplus measured by triangle 
WYX and converting producer's surplus P*WXM into consumers' surplus.  Public policy limits 
patent lives in part because, if producer's surplus is sufficient to induce R&D, policy-makers do 
not want to delay indefinitely the realization of the consumers' surplus increment WYX.  See 
Nordhaus (1969, pp. 70-90).   
  Now if competitive rent-seeking raises R&D costs to dissipate producers' surpluses 
totally, P*WXM can no longer be counted as a welfare gain during the period of patent 
monopoly.  Rather, the gain is offset by R&D cost (dotted area).  After patents expire, 
rectangular surplus P*WXM is not captured by product innovators, so it does not stimulate 
additional R&D.  It becomes a pure surplus not offset by costs.  Thus, the welfare gain pre-
patent-expiry is only triangle ZWP* rather than the larger trapezoid ZWXM, and after patent 
expiry, the incremental welfare gain (beyond ZWP*) is trapezoid P*WYM.  The net welfare gain 
in a competitive rent-seeking context is smaller while the patent is in force and larger 
incrementally after the patent expires.  This, as simple models of cost-saving (process) invention 34 
 
have shown, leads to substantially shorter optimal patent lives -- e.g., in those models, as short as 
one year, compared to the much longer lives found in models without competitive rent 
dissipation.
46 
  The cost-saving patented invention model, however, abstracts from important 
alternatives.  In a market-oriented economy, private sector investments in research and 
development are driven (i.e., induced) by changes in demand conditions and by the fecundity of 
the science base.  The simplest plausible model of these "demand-pull" and "science-push" 
influences is illustrated in Figure 7.
47  The R&D cost of achieving a specific innovation is 
assumed to be 2500 (with appropriate trailing zeroes) and to decline with the advance of science 
at a steady rate, e.g., as shown, at 3 percent per year.  When discounted to year zero present 
value at a 10 percent interest rate, this is shown by a declining R&D Cost curve.  (A sudden 
scientific breakthrough would impart a one-time downward shift in the curve.)  The demand side 
of the equation is modelled by a Private Benefit function, which is the discounted present value 
of the quasi-rents (analogous to gross margins) appropriable by the innovator.  The initial depth 
of the stream is 100 per year, growing with demand at 4 percent per year.
48  (A sudden spurt of 
demand, e.g. with the emergence of a new disease, would cause an upward jump in the curve.)  
Up to year 5.8 in Figure 7, discounted R&D costs exceed discounted private benefits, and a drug 
company with correct foresight would not undertake the development and testing effort.  The 
first profitable instant -- the "breakeven" point -- occurs with the parameters assumed at year 5.8.  
However, a monopoly securely in control of the relevant therapeutic market would delay its 
R&D project (assumed for simplicity to consume at most one year) to year 17, when the 
discounted surplus of quasi-rents over R&D costs is maximized.  But competition could force 
firms to accelerate their efforts or risk being pre-empted by either identified (contrary to the 
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Henderson-Cockburn evidence) or inchoate rivals.  Conceivably, the pace may be forced all the 
way forward to private break-even year 5.8.  If such a competitive process operated, one would 
observe substantial R&D investments but on average no supra-normal returns. 
  It remains to be asked, is the competitive acceleration of R&D desirable or undesirable 
from a broader economic perspective?  The answer lies in the likelihood that even with patent 
monopolies, innovators are unlikely to appropriate as private gain all of the benefits from their 
innovations.  There are also consumers' surpluses (e.g., triangle AWP* in Figure 6).  The dot-
dash line in Figure 7 assumes total social benefits -- i.e., producer's surplus plus consumers' 
surplus) -- to be twice private benefits.
49  Given that assumed divergence and the other assumed 
parameters, the innovation date that maximizes the surplus of social benefits minus R&D costs is 
7 years -- close to the competitive break-even date.  The larger the wedge between social and 
private benefits, ceteris paribus, the earlier the maximum social welfare date falls relative to the 
private break-even date.
50 
  This lean model abstracts among other things from uncertainty.  In fact, as we have seen, 
substantial uncertainties pervade all phases of the drug discovery and development process.   
When a safe and efficacious molecule cannot be identified in advance, pursuing parallel paths, 
i.e., synthesizing and testing numerous alternative molecules, is often desirable.  Figure 8 
demonstrates a particularly simple version of the parallel paths strategy.
51  It assumes that all 
R&D projects can be carried out within a single year and are pursued simultaneously in year 1.  
Once a successful molecule is found, the innovator realizes diverse quasi-rents, constant over 
time and continuing through year 25.
52  Each R&D project is assumed to cost $1 (with as many 
appended zeroes as reality requires), and the discount rate is 6 percent.
53  Uniform expected 
                                                 
49.  In the leading effort to measure this relationship, Edwin Mansfield (1977) found the median value of social 
benefits to be 2.25 times private benefits. 
50.  When a is the rate of decline in R&D costs, g is the growth rate of annual-quasi rents, r is the discount rate, and 
social benefits are k times private benefits, the social optimum and private break-even coincide when k = (r+a)/(r-
g).   
51.  It is adapted from Scherer (1966).  More complex strategies are explored there and in Scherer (2007b). 
52.  Multiple successes undoubtedly have value, but the analysis assumes that one success suffices. 
53. Assuming at least one success in year 1, sales revenues and quasi-rents are assumed to begin only at the end of 36 
 
success probabilities per path (i.e., molecule) are assumed to range from 0.01 (approximating 
conditions in pre-clinical animal testing) to 0.2 (approximating the success rate of full-scale 
human trials).  Plotted in Figure 8 are the profit-maximizing numbers of parallel paths as a 
function of the quasi-rent stream's depth.
54  One sees that the deeper the stream of anticipated 
benefits, the larger is the optimal number of parallel paths.  And the lower is the probability of 
success for any single path, the more sensitive the optimal number of paths is to differences in 
the depth of the quasi-rent stream.
55  These relationships appear to accord at least roughly with 
the reality of actual pharmaceutical industry behavior.  For example, some 50 to 60 candidates 
for therapy against Alzheimer's disease -- a scourge expected to consume $100 billion in health 
care resources per year within the United States -- were undergoing clinical trials in 2006.
56   
Approximately 2,000 cancer drugs were in development.
57  A successful drug in either category 
could yield substantial payoffs to both its innovator and society at large. 
  Does the pursuit of parallel paths exhaust discounted quasi-rents, leading to only normal 
profits, as suggested by evidence on the pharmaceutical industry?  Figure 9 shows profits 
(discounted quasi-rents less R&D costs) as a percentage of discounted quasi-rents for the four 
success probability cases analyzed in Figure 8.  Except in the PS = 0.01 case, profits are positive 
across all indicated quasi-rent stream benefits.  They increase with the depth of quasi-rent 
streams to substantial percentages.  Thus, except in low-probability, low-value cases, the 
observed near-zero supra-normal profit outcome is not approximated. 
  Figures 8 and 9 assume that firms choose the parallel paths strategy expected to 
                                                                                                                                                             
year 2. 
54.  For annual quasi-rents of less than 10, there are no profitable single or parallel paths strategies with the assumed 
parameters.  The average cost of R&D across all cases is 42, which is roughly 19 percent of the average discounted 
value of quasi-rents.   
55.  The elasticities of optimal path numbers relative to quasi-rents are 1.32 for PS = 0.01, 0.64 for PS = 0.05, 0.41 
for PS = 0.1, and 0.32 for PS = 0.2. 
56.  See "Decoding Alzheimer's," Business Week, Jan. 8, 2007, p. 54; "Closing in on Alzheimer's," AARP Bulletin, 
June 2007, p. 10; and "Taking on Alzheimer's," New York Times, June 10, 2007, p. 3-1,4.  Note in Figure 8 that the 
optimal number of parallel paths for the deepest quasi-rent stream shown is 39 with a single-path success probability 
of 0.10, approximating the uncertainties in clinically testing drugs for a disease against which there are no effective 
therapies. 
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maximize profits, analogously to the 17-year monopoly profit-maximizing product introduction 
timing of Figure 6.  However, when social benefits exceed private benefits by an appreciable 
multiple, a larger number of parallel paths is socially optimal than under the private profit 
maximization assumption.  An additional analysis assuming the parametric relationships of 
Figure 8 derived the net social benefit-maximizing number of paths, assuming social benefits to 
be twice privately appropriable benefits.  For success probabilities of 0.05 or more, private 
profits were positive, and often quite substantial, over all annual social benefit stream depths of 
10 or more.  However, with success probabilities of only one in 100, private profits were 
negative for all benefit streams of less than 30 per year.  In such cases, either excessive 
competitive optimism or government subsidies could help compensate for market failures that 
stem from low ex ante success probabilities and concomitantly high risks. 
  We conclude that the competitive rent-seeking observed in the pharmaceutical industry 
can help correct what otherwise might be market failures attributable to the disparity between 
social and privately appropriable benefits.  Whether the "correct" amount of R&D, associated in 
part with the pursuit of parallel paths, is induced, cannot be determined from the lean theoretical 
assumptions accepted here.  This is a problem on which additional research, both theoretical and 
factual, is much to be desired. 
 
11. Developing New Drugs and Vaccines for Third World Diseases 
 
  Reverting to the simpler and less controversial assumption that pharmaceutical 
innovation is motivated by the lure of profits, a further dilemma presents itself.  Rich consumers 
are able and willing to pay, either directly or through taxes and transfers, for an ample array of 
drugs to combat the diseases and debility afflicting them.  For the consumers in nations with very 
low per-capita incomes, who tend to be concentrated in tropical areas harboring diseases such as 
malaria, sleeping sickness, and leishmaniasis seldom prevalent in the industrialized world, 
demand may be insufficient to yield quasi-rents inducing substantial investments in disease-
alleviating R&D.  A study by Medicins sans Frontieres (2001) found that among 1,393 new drug 
chemical entities introduced into world markets between 1975 and 1999, only 13 (or 15 counting 
tuberculosis drugs) were indicated for so-called "tropical" diseases.  Clearly, the invisible hand 
falters in guiding research toward the needs of low-income populations.     38 
 
  There are several possible solutions.  Prior to the Uruguay Round of international trade 
negotiations, concluded in 1994, many third-world nations (and some rich nations) did not offer 
patent protection on new pharmaceutical products.  The resulting treaty required inter alia the 
provision of such patent rights in all World Trade Organization member nations by the year 2005 
(later extended for the least-developed nations to 2016).  One rationale was that this policy 
change would stimulate the development of medicines for tropical diseases, either by 
multinational pharmaceutical companies or enterprises based in low-income nations.  (India, for 
example, was home to several of the world's leading generic drug suppliers.)  Whether this 
strategy will work remains to be seen, but there are grounds for skepticism.  See Lanjouw (1997, 
2002).  If under the logic of Figure 6, demand curves for drugs in low-income nations lie too 
close to marginal production cost functions, the pool of attainable quasi-rents will be too small to 
stimulate much development of tropical disease drugs by profit-seeking firms. 
  If private markets fail, a humanitarian case for governmental or philanthropic 
intervention exists.  Governments and philanthropic agencies might intervene on either the 
supply side or the demand side. 
  On the supply side, research and testing on tropical drugs might be conducted in 
government or government-supported laboratories, or grants could be issued to private 
corporations to subsidize the development of tropical disease therapies.  The U.S. Army's Walter 
Reed Hospital was once a leader in developing drugs to combat malaria and other tropical 
diseases.  But as the desire to station American troops in tropical nations faded after the Vietnam 
War, so also did interest in developing such medicines.  Thus, contracts and grants for altruistic 
motives remained the main supply-side recourse.  Splendid work by the Gates Foundation, 
among others, has been done, but those activities, oriented thus far mainly toward basic research 
and therapeutic molecule discovery, are of too recent vintage to assess success.  The alternative, 
especially when high-cost drug development and clinical testing stages are reached, is for 
governments to issue contracts to private enterprises -- presumably, the various pharmaceutical 
companies.  Here the well-known agency-theoretic problems associated with national defense 
research and development contracting are encountered.  Government agencies are not always 
adept at picking winning technological approaches, and indeed, given the uncertainties of drug 
discovery, one must be tolerant -- although legislatures seldom are -- of frequent failure.  The 39 
 
choice problem is aggravated by the tendency of contract-seekers to exaggerate their chances of 
success at the early proposal stage and to underestimate the costs.  Special contractual 
arrangements, such as cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, may be necessary to transfer what would 
otherwise be unacceptable technological risks from private firms to the government sponsor.  
These often provide inadequate incentives for efficient operation and open the way to other 
moral hazards.  See Peck and Scherer (1962).  
  An alternative to intervention on the technology-push side is for government agencies to 
create special demand-side incentives for research and development.  An interesting and 
attractive approach was the advance purchase approach to inducing new vaccine development 
endorsed by the G-8 nations in 2005 and 2006.  See Levine et al. (2005) and Berndt and Hurvitz 
(2005).  Emphasizing the development of vaccines rather than traditional therapeutic 
pharmaceuticals was attractive because vaccines can prevent disease through one or very few 
inoculations, whereas treatment once a disease has taken hold often requires repeated and 
perhaps even life-long medical interventions that overstrain the healthcare delivery capabilities 
of low-income nations.  One disadvantage of the vaccine approach is the particularly extensive 
and lengthy clinical testing required, since one cannot ethically tell in advance who would 
otherwise incur the target disease.  The advantage of vaccines from the perspective of 
administration in low-income nations is a disadvantage for pharmaceutical companies, since each 
patient requires only one or a very few doses, which leaves much less demand than for medicines 
that will be administered once a day for many days or even years.  Recognizing these problems, 
the G-8 proposal identified three target diseases  -- HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.  For 
each, a generalized agreement to purchase 200 million doses at a prespecified subsidy of $15 per 
dose would be announced, i.e., embodying a total commitment of $3 billion per disease, paid 
only if the goal of successful new vaccine development were achieved.  The purchase would be 
conditional upon the development of effective vaccines, with efficacy judged against standards 
articulated by a coordinating committee and by the national health authorities of nations 
administering the vaccine (which would add their own more modest subsidies to the purchase 
price).  Quantities above 200 million would be procured at prices to be negotiated through a 
process that remained unclear at the time the proposal was approved.  At the time this essay was 
written, the G-8 governments had not made available the required financial commitments to 40 
 
induce development of new vaccines.  However, funds were advanced for procurement of a 
pneumococcus vaccine already in the late stages of testing.
58   Thus, a judgment on the success 
of the advance purchase commitment approach would be premature.  What is clear is that an 
important market failure persists with respect to incentives for the discovery and development of 
therapies effective against diseases threatening one to two billion inhabitants of low-income 




  The pharmaceutical industry provides a fascinating laboratory for studying what we 
know and what we don't know about the economics of innovation.  The industry has an 
extraordinary innovation record; it faces major risks and uncertainties in its efforts to solve new 
therapeutic problems; its links to academic science bases are unusually rich and deep; and the 
industry's responsiveness or lack thereof to economic stimuli is of considerable interest.  That 
said, it must be admitted that there is much we still do not understand about the pharmaceutical 
innovation process.  As always, more work remains to be done. 
                                                 
58.  "Wealthy Nations Announce Plan To Develop and Pay for Vaccines," New York Times, Feb. 10, 2007, p. 3. 41 
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